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Harris and Peeples: MedMal Claims Paid in North Carolina

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION IN NORTH CAROLINA:
WHAT CLAIMS GET PAID, AND FOR HOW MUCH?
Catherine T. Harris and Ralph Peeples*
Medical malpractice litigation lends itself to empirical research. This
article draws on a unique dataset consisting of all the filed cases closed
by a major medical malpractice insurer over a two-year period. Using
this data, this article addresses two questions. First, what factors drive
indemnity payments made in settlement of claims? Second, what factors
drive the amount of those indemnity payments? We were able to assess a
number of potential factors affecting case resolution that are rarely
available to researchers. We find that the insurer’s internal assessment
of potential liability, along with the number of experts designated by the
parties, is a strong predictor of payment. We also find that once the
decision to seek a settlement is made by the insurer, non-medical factors
become significant. Specifically, the plaintiff’s age and marital status, as
well as the number of experts designated by the plaintiff, are the most
important predictors of the amount of payment. The severity of the
plaintiff’s injury is not a reliable predictor of the amount of payment.

*Professor of Sociology, Wake Forest University and Professor of Law (Emeritus) Wake Forest
University
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INTRODUCTION
The topics of medical malpractice litigation and medical malpractice
reform just don’t seem to go away. Several bills meant to reform the
current system were introduced in the 115th Congress in 2017.1 The
topics continue to receive academic attention.2 One might question the
need to talk about medical malpractice reform at a time when no insurance
crisis exists, and at a time when neither the number nor amount of paid
indemnity claims is increasing.3 Still, as Mello et al.4 suggest, because
there is no crisis, this is an appropriate time for thinking objectively about
medical malpractice, and for reviewing what we know and what we don’t
know.
This article takes an empirical approach to two questions. First, what
factors lead to a monetary recovery for medical malpractice plaintiffs?
Second, if a payment is made, what factors affect the amount of the
payment? In answering those two questions, we introduce factors rarely
seen when analyzing medical malpractice litigation. We are able to do this
thanks to our access to a closed claims database maintained by a medical
malpractice insurer doing business in North Carolina.
We also approach the data from a case perspective rather than a claim
perspective. This is a less frequently traveled path in medical malpractice
research.5 As Rahmati et al. have observed, this approach necessarily
examines success rates from the plaintiff’s perspective, rather than from
the defendant’s perspective.6 The distinction arises from the fact that a
single lawsuit may name more than one defendant, whereas a claim
always involves a single defendant.

1. See, e.g., American Healthcare Reform Act, H.R. 277, 115th Cong. (2017) and Saving Lives,
Saving Costs Act, 115th Cong. (2017). See generally Michelle M. Mello et al., Medical Liability—
Prospects for Federal Reform, in 376 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1806 (2017); Anand Parekh and G. William
Hoagland, Medical Liability Reform in a New Political Environment, in 317 JAMA 1311 (2017).
2. See, e.g., Lydia Nussbaum, Trial and Error: Legislating ADR For Medical Malpractice
Reform, 76 MD. L. REV. 247 (2017); Daniela Talmadge, Keeping Medical Liability Costs Down: How
Captive Insurance and Damages Caps Could Help Control Rising Healthcare Costs, 43 J. CORP. L. 201
(2017); Patricia Born and J. Bradley Karl, The Effect of Tort Reform on Medical Malpractice Insurance
Market Trends, 13 J. EMP. LEG. STUDIES 718 (2016); Mohammad Rahmati et al., Medical Malpractice
Claiming in Illinois, 1980-2010, 13 J. EMP. LEG. STUDIES 183 (2016); Jason A. Stamm et al., Medical
Malpractice Reform for Today’s Patients and Clinicians, 129 AM. J. MED. 20 (2016).
3. Mello, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Mohammed Rahmati et al., Screening Plaintiffs and Selecting Defendants in Medical
Malpractice Litigation: Evidence from Illinois and Indiana, Working Paper 2017 at 5 (hereinafter
“Screening Plaintiffs”).
6. Id. at 35.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
The number of medical malpractice claims and volume of medical
malpractice litigation has been in decline for more than a decade. 7 The
average payout per physician has also declined.8 Liability insurance
seems to be available, although the premiums for some specialties will be
higher than for others (as they have always been). A number of factors
may help explain these trends, but tort reform–damage caps in particular–
does not appear to be the principal factor. Meanwhile, fewer physicians
are engaged in traditional private practice, with a practice unaffiliated
with a hospital or medical center.9 Perhaps one or more of these trends
will change, and medical malpractice litigation will again take center
stage in the tort reform debate. History suggests that it will, given the
various malpractice insurance crises of the past forty years. 10 Regardless
of what happens, this is a good time to review what we know, and what
we don’t know, about medical malpractice litigation.
When analyzed at the level of claims payment, without regard to the
amount of payment, medical malpractice is a quite rational process, as
researchers have frequently noted.11 Meritorious claims are paid, and nonmeritorious claims are not paid. A more difficult question arises with the
amount of payment. Do the amounts paid to resolve a claim follow a
pattern, or are they just random?
Almost thirty years ago, Sloan and Hsieh analyzed both indemnity
payments and the amount of those payments, relying on several sets of
data.12 Comparing payment amounts to the level of the alleged severity of
the injury, Sloan and Hsieh concluded that payments, in general, rose with
severity of injury.13 They also noted, however, that payments within a
given level of severity were quite variable.14 In this article, we also
examine what factors are associated with payment, as well as what factors
are associated with the amount of payment.

7. Mello, supra note 1; Paik, Bernard S. Black and David A. Hyman, The Receding Tide of
Medical Malpractice Litigation: Part 1- National Trends, 10 J. EMP. LEG. STUDIES 612, 614 (2013).
8. Id. at 614.
9. Stamm, supra note 2.
10. See Nussbaum, supra note 2 at 263-264.
11. Patricia M. Danzon, Medical Malpractice: Theory, Evidence, and Public Policy (Harvard
Univeristy Press 1985); Frederick W. Cheney et al., Standard of Care and Anesthesia Liability, 261
JAMA 1599 (1989); Mark I. Taragin et al., The Influence of Standard of Care and Severity of Injury on
the Resolution of Medical Malpractice Claims, 117 ANNALS OF INT. MED. 780 (1992); Frank A. Sloan,
Suing for Malpractice (1993).
12. Frank A. Sloan and Chee Ruey Hsieh, Variability in Medical Malpractice Payments: Is the
Compensation Fair?, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 997 (1990).
13. Id.
14. Id.
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THE DATA
We collected data from the closed files of a major North Carolina
medical malpractice insurer. Our data consists of all filed lawsuits15
involving one or more of the company’s insured physicians closed
between 2013 and 2015. As a result, we have information on 229 separate
lawsuits involving 339 defendants.
We were given access to the same information available to the
company’s claims adjusters. We thus have extensive data over a wide
variety of categories, many of which are rarely, if ever, made available to
researchers. Our data is rich in detail. It is more extensive and more
nuanced than the information typically provided to state insurance
regulators, the sort of information many researchers rely on.
Our data includes information on things such as the duration of the
lawsuits, the outcome of the lawsuits, the severity of the injuries alleged,
the medical specialties of the individual defendants, the amount (if any)
paid to the plaintiff, and the expenses incurred by the insurer in defending
each claim. We also collected information on the system and part of the
body involved, the specific medical allegation made, the nature of the
allegation made, and the specific allegations made by plaintiff’s counsel.
We have information about the individual defendant’s involvement (e.g.,
attending, consulting, on-call) as well as the number of co-defendants. We
collected demographic information as to the plaintiff’s gender, marital
status, race, age, and type of insurance. We also counted the number of
experts designated by plaintiff and defendant in each case. We have
limited information about the number and amount of offers made by each
side. Finally, we have the insurer’s internal assessment of liability for
each case.
In the tables below, we describe the data by several different attributes:
1. Severity of alleged injury.
We used the standard scale used by the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners. That scale allows injuries to be classified on
an ascending scale of severity. In Table 1, we report on the number of
filed cases within each category, and the frequency with which claims in
each category received an indemnity payment.

15. It is important to distinguish between “claims” and “lawsuits.” “Claims,” as tracked by the
insurer, may or may not lead to indemnity payments, and may or may not develop into “lawsuits.” In
addition, “lawsuits” may or may not begin as “claims.” We encountered a number of cases in which the
filing of a lawsuit was the first indication the insurer had that a plaintiff was seeking compensation for his
or her alleged injury. In this article, we report only on lawsuits—whether they first appeared as claims or
not.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss3/1

4

Harris and Peeples: MedMal Claims Paid in North Carolina

2019]

MEDMAL CLAIMS PAID IN NORTH CAROLINA

649

Table 1
Lawsuits By Severity of Injury.
Severity
Level
1
2
3
4
5
6

Description
Emotional
Only

No.

Pct.

No.
Paid

Percentage

Average/Median
Amount Paid

6

2.6

0

-

-

Insignificant

11

4.8

0

-

-

18

7.9

6

33.3

31

13.5

9

29.0

6

2.6

4

66.7

52

22.7

16

30.8

Minor
Temporary
Major
Temporary
Minor
Permanent
Major
Permanent

7

Significant
Permanent

19

8.3

6

31.6

8

Grave

8

3.5

5

62.5

9

Death

78

34.1

25

32.1

229

100.0

71

31.0

Total

$97,056/
$42,500
$314,722/
$225,000
$306,629/
$223,750
$939,679/
$750,000
$414,916/
$287,250
$709,900/
$500,000
$242,271/
$162,500

Table 1 suggests several things. First, most of the alleged injuries were
quite serious in nature: 157 of the 229 cases (68.6%) were graded at
severity levels 6-9. This is not surprising. Pursuing a medical malpractice
claim is expensive and time consuming.16 The potential recovery has to
justify the time and money spent seeking it. The top-heavy nature of the
alleged injuries is consistent with previous findings by Rahmati et al.17
Second, two categories, “major permanent” and “death,” alone accounted
for more than half of the cases. Third, while the average and median
amounts recovered increase from severity level 3 (“minor temporary”) to
severity levels 8 and 9 (“grave” and “death”), the increase overall can
hardly be described as a straight line. For example, the average and
median recoveries for severity level 6 (“major permanent”) are greater
than the average and median recoveries for severity levels 8 (“grave”) and
9 (“death”). Finally, the likelihood of obtaining payment, overall, is low
(30.1%).
16. Stephen Daniels et al., It Was the Best of Times, it was the Worst of Times: The Precarious
Nature of Plaintiffs’ Practice in Texas, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1781, 1798 (2002); Paul C. Weiler, The Case for
No-Fault Medical Liability, 52 MD. L. REV. 908, 915 (1993).
17. Rahmati, supra note 2 at 184.
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2. Specialty of Primary Defendant
Some specialties were more frequently the subject of a lawsuit than
others. Table 2 lists the ten medical specialties most often sued, using the
specialty of the primary defendant.18
Table 2
Medical Specialties of Defendants
Specialty of Primary Defendant

Number of Lawsuits

Percentage

Radiology (diagnostic and internal)

21

9.2

General Surgery

19

8.3

Internal Medicine

18

7.9

Family Practice

17

7.4

Orthopedic Surgery
(including spine)

17

7.4

Emergency Medicine

17

7.4

Vicarious (employer or practice)

13

5.7

Orthopedic Surgery (no spine)

12

5.2

Urology

11

4.8

OB-GYN

10

4.4

155

67.7

Total

Twenty-five other specialties accounted for the remainder of the cases.
While it is common in medical malpractice litigation to name the practice
or the employer as an additional defendant, in only 13 cases was the
practice or the employer in fact the primary defendant.
3. Expenses Paid
Defending a malpractice case is usually expensive. Expenses paid by
the insurer varied greatly from case to case, from a low of $1,269 to a
high of $3,335,633. The mean expense paid was $166,986 and the median
expense paid was $90,599. The bulk of these expenses were attributable
to the fees paid to defense counsel.
18. When multiple defendants were named in a single lawsuit, we defined the “primary defendant”
on the basis of two questions. First, if an indemnity payment was made, we treated the defendant on whose
behalf the highest payment was made as the primary defendant. Second, if an indemnity payment was not
made, we treated the defendant to whom the highest expenses were charged as the primary defendant.
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4. Indemnity Paid
Sixty-nine of the 229 cases (30.1%) resulted in an indemnity payment
to the plaintiff. As with expenses, the amount of indemnity paid varied
greatly, from $4,618 to $2,479,384. The mean payment was $442,986 and
the median payment was $237,500. Of these sixty-nine cases, only one
was the result of a plaintiff’s verdict at trial. A second was the result of
binding arbitration. The remaining sixty-seven cases in which an
indemnity was paid were settlements.
5. Attorneys
Plaintiffs in the 229 cases were represented by 128 different attorneys.
In sixteen of the cases, the plaintiff appeared pro se.19 In contrast, the
defendants were represented by only 25 different attorneys from fourteen
law firms. Five of those 25 defense attorneys accounted for more than half
(119) of the 229 cases.
6. Medical Allegation and Nature of Allegation
The specific allegations made in the complaint were translated by the
insurer into “medical allegations.” A total of 36 different medical
allegations appeared in the data. The most frequently occurring medical
allegations were “treatment, inappropriate or incomplete” (n=46), “failure
to recognize complications” (n=24), and “treatment, injury apart from
intended treatment of care” (n=23). The specific allegations made in the
complaint were also categorized by “nature of allegation.” More than 80%
of the cases fell into three categories. Seventy of the cases were described
as “surgery related,” 68 cases were described as “treatment related,” and
54 cases were described as “diagnosis related.”
7. Demographics
Plaintiffs were almost evenly divided by gender (111 males, 117
females), and ranged in age from less than one year old to 91. The mean
age of plaintiffs was 49.7 and the median age was 52.
Tables 3, 4, and 5 describe the marital status, race, and the plaintiffs’
type of medical insurance. However, because marital status, race, and
type of insurance of the plaintiff were not always recorded, we are unable
to account for all plaintiffs.

19. In only one of those sixteen cases did the pro se plaintiff recover.
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Table 3
Marital Status of Plaintiffs
Marital Status

Number

Percentage

Single

18

7.9

Married

118

51.5

Divorced

15

6.6

Widowed

10

4.4

Child Under 18

6

2.6

Infant (under 1 year)

9

3.9

Unknown

53

23.1

229

100.0

Total

Table 4
Race of Plaintiffs
Race
Caucasian

Number
124

Percentage
54.1

African-American

35

15.3

Hispanic

2

0.9

Other

5

2.2

Unknown/ No Record

63

27.5

Total

229

100.0

Table 5
Type of Medical Insurance
Type of Insurance

Number

Percentage

Private

73

31.9

Medicaid

19

8.3

Medicare

65

28.4

Military

1

0.4

Workers’ Compensation

4

1.7

None

3

1.3

Unknown/ No Record

64

27.9

229

99.9

Total
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8. Number of Experts
Typically, experts are called to describe the relevant standard of care
for the defendant physicians.20 In fact, North Carolina law requires the
plaintiff to assert in the complaint that he or she has obtained a favorable
opinion from an expert in the relevant medical field.21 As a result, expert
testimony is common in medical malpractice litigation. 22 However,
because we collected data on all filed medical malpractice cases, not all
of the cases we examined involved the use of experts. Most of these cases
were simply dismissed before experts had to be designated. In addition, a
few cases relied on a “res ipsa loquitur” theory, in which an expert might
not be necessary.
In 184 of the cases, defense experts were identified. The number of
defense experts designated per case ranged from 1 to 14; the mean was
3.44 and the median was 3. Plaintiff’s experts were identified in 170 of
the cases. The number of plaintiff’s experts ranged from 1 to 29; the mean
was 2.80 and the median was 2.00. Thus, defense experts generally
outnumbered plaintiffs’ experts.
9. Venue, Trials, and Appeals
All of the cases were filed and concluded in North Carolina. Lawsuits
came from 51 of North Carolina’s 100 counties. The three most frequent
venues were Wake County (Raleigh) (n=31); Mecklenburg County
(Charlotte) (n=23); and New Hanover County (Wilmington) (n=20).
Twenty-six cases (11.4%) went to trial, but only seventeen ended in a
verdict. One case was arbitrated. Three defense verdicts were appealed.
All three were affirmed.
10. Outcomes
Table 6 describes the final outcomes of the 228 lawsuits.

20. Catherine T. Struve, The Adversary System and Procedural Reform in Medical Liability
Litigation, 72 FORDH. L. REV. 943, 976 (2004).
21. N.C.GEN.STAT. section 90-21.12; N.C.R. C.P. 9(j).
22. Tom Baker, The Medical Maplractice Myth 16 (2005); Frank A. Sloan et al., Suing for Medical
Malpractice 5-6 (1993).
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Table 6
Final Outcome of Cases Filed
Outcome

Number

Percentage

Involuntary Dismissal

13

5.7

Voluntary Dismissal,
no Money Received

102

44.5

Summary Judgment for Defendant(s)

5

2.2

Defense Verdict
Following Trial

16

7.0

Settled for Costs

20

8.7

Voluntary Dismissal,
Money Paid to Plaintiff

71

31.0

Plaintiff’s Verdict
Following Trial

1

0.4

Binding Arbitration,
Award for Plaintiff

1

0.4

229

100.0

Total

The results in Table 6 are not surprising.23 Voluntary dismissals, with
no money paid by the defense, were the most frequent outcome (n=102,
44.5%). Plaintiffs recovered money in only 31% of the cases, regardless
of the amount recovered. Treating binding arbitration as a trial,
defendants prevailed at trial over 91% of the time (21 of 23 cases).
11. Liability Rating
After a lawsuit has been filed, the insurer reviews the relevant medical
records and makes an internal determination of the insured’s liability.
Liability is then rated according to a five-category scale: clear, probable,
questionable, unknown, and none. Table 7 summarizes the liability
assessments made by the insurer.

23. These results are comparable to results reported in other studies from other states.
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Table 7
Liability Assessments of Insurer
Liability Rating

Number

Percentage

Clear

10

4.7

Probable

36

16.7

Questionable

26

12.1

Unknown

44

20.5

None

99

46.0

N=215. In 14 cases, a liability rating was not available.
FINDINGS
We set out to answer two questions: first, what factors predict an
indemnity payment24 to the plaintiff and second, when a payment is made,
what factors predict the amount of that payment.
Predicting Payment
Overall, 69 of 229 plaintiffs (30.1%) received an indemnity payment.
We found a very strong correlation between the insurer’s internal
assessment of liability (Table 7) and the payment of money to the
plaintiff. A simple linear regression using only liability rating as an
independent variable was highly significant (p= .000, R-square= .640).25
When two additional independent variables were added (number of
plaintiff’s experts and number of defense experts) the model remained
highly significant, and the R-square increased to .669. However, “liability
24. By “indemnity payment,” we mean money actually paid to the plaintiff. As noted in Table 6,
twenty cases were “settled for costs,” meaning that the insurer agreed to pay some or all or the plaintiff’s
counsel’s expenses, but did not pay money to the plaintiff.
25. “R-squared,” also known as the coefficient of determination, is a statistical measure of the
relationship between two variables. It is a measure of the extent to which the behavior of one variable can
predict the behavior of a second variable. By convention, it can vary between 0 and 1.00. Our reported Rsquared value of .640 indicates a strong correlation between the insurer’s internal assessment of liability
and the eventual payment of a claim. Our reported R-squared value of .669 suggests an even stronger
correlation between the insurer’s internal assessment of liability, the number of plaintiff’s experts, and the
number of defense experts with the eventual payment of a claim. The inference is that these variables
drive the decision by the insurer to make an indemnity payment. Regression analysis (reported at Tables
9 and 10, infra) is closely related to the concept of R-squared. Regression analysis determines the
relationship between one or more independent variables and a dependent variable (in this paper, the
amount of payment made to the plaintiff). See generally Alan Agresti and Barbara Finlay, Statistical
Methods for the Social Sciences 394 (3d ed. 1997).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019

11

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 1

656

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87

rating” was the strongest single predictor. Table 8 shows the relationship
between “liability rating” and payment.
Table 8
Liability Rating and Payment
Liability
Rating*

Indemnity
Paid

Indemnity
Not Paid

Percentage
Paid

Total

Clear

10

0

100

10

Probable

34

2

94.4

36

Questionable

16

10

61.5

26

Unknown

6

38

13.6

44

None

2

97

2

99

68

147

31.6

215

Total

*A liability rating was not available for 14 of the cases.
Further evidence of the predictive value of the insurer’s internal
liability rating comes from the 22 cases that went to trial and the one case
that went to binding arbitration (Table 6). Defendants won five motions
for summary judgment and obtained 16 defense verdicts. Plaintiffs
prevailed only once at trial and once in binding arbitration.
Of the 21 cases won by the defendant, the insurer’s liability rating
included one “questionable” case, three “unknown” cases, and 17 “no
liability” cases. In contrast, the single plaintiff’s verdict and the binding
arbitration award were both from cases with liability rated as “probable.”
Predicting The Amount of Payment
The fact that the insurer concluded that its insured is likely liable in a
claim for malpractice tells us very little about the amount that will be
necessary to settle the case. A simple linear regression indicates that the
relationship between “liability rating” and the amount of the indemnity
paid is statistically insignificant. Once the determination to seek a
settlement has been made, other factors become important in answering
the question of “how much?” Table 9 describes the factors that affect the
amount of the indemnity paid, using multiple regression analysis.
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Table 9
Factors Affecting Amount of Indemnity Paid
Standardized
Coefficients

t

p

Age of plaintiff

-.272

2.020

.048

Is plaintiff married?

.243

2.266

.027

Is plaintiff a child
under 18?

-.170

-1.205

.233

Gender

.063

.599

.552

Severity of injury

-.074

-.705

.484

Nature of allegationdiagnosis related

.204

1.822

Nature of allegation
treatment related

-.085

-.803

.425

Number of plaintiff’s
experts

.482

4.405

.000

1.988

.051

Independent Variables
Demographic

Medical

.073

Legal

Constant
R-squared = .419
Model significance = .000

When race of the claimant is added as a demographic factor, the results
stay significant, and the R-squared increases, but at a price: the race of the
claimant was available in 166 of the 229 cases (72.5%). Of the 166 cases
in which race was identified, 124 claimants were classified as Caucasian,
and 42 were classified as non-Caucasian.
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Table 10
Factors Affecting Amount of Indemnity Paid
Standardized
Coefficients

t

p

Age of plaintiff

-.322

-2.294

.026

Is plaintiff married?

.198

1.773

.082

Is plaintiff a child
under 18?

-.187

-1.262

.212

Gender

.091

.849

.400

Is plaintiff Caucasian?

.107

.998

.322

Severity of injury

-.087

-.790

.433

Nature of allegationdiagnosis related

.206

1.782

Nature of allegation
treatment related

-.099

-.908

.368

Number of plaintiff’s
experts

.480

4.316

.000

1.150

.255

Independent Variables
Demographic

Medical

.080

Legal

Constant
R-squared = .445
Model significance = .000

Comparing Tables 9 and 10, two variables remain significant: the age
of the plaintiff and the number of plaintiff’s experts. Neither race nor
gender are significant predictors. Marital status is a significant predictor
in Table 9, but not in Table 10. None of the medical variables are
significant predictors, although the variable “nature of allegation
diagnostic related” approached significance in both models.
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Severity of injury was not a significant predictor of the amount of
payment in either of the two models described above. In that sense, our
findings are at variance with Sloan and Hsieh’s findings, discussed
earlier.26 One reason for this is the fact that the highest severity level—
death—resulted in lower average and median payments than those
associated with all other severity levels, except severity level 3 (“minor
temporary”).27 When death cases are removed from the analysis, “severity
of injury” is not a significant predictor of the amount of payment, but the
R-squared result improves to .553. While there is some evidence of
“vertical equity” in the indemnity payments (Table 1), the average and
median payment amounts do not increase in orderly fashion. This may be
due, however, to the relatively small numbers we report.
We found large disparities in the amount of indemnity payments within
given levels of severity. For example, the six indemnity payments made
for severity level 3 (minor temporary injuries) ranged from $4,618 to
$395,000 ($97,056 mean, $42,500 median) and the twenty-five indemnity
payments for severity level 9 (death) ranged from $10,000 to $750,000
($242,271 mean, $162,500 median). These results echo Sloan and Hsieh’s
finding about the lack of “horizontal equity” in indemnity payments.28
However, an examination of the attributes of the cases within those two
levels of severity provide plausible reasons for the disparity of payment.
For the twenty-five death cases, the age of the claimant ranged from infant
under one year old to 91. The liability ratings also varied, suggesting that
the insurer and plaintiff’s counsel adjusted the amounts offered and
demanded in light of the probable outcome at trial.
DISCUSSION
It is no accident that out of twenty-two trials and one arbitration, the
plaintiff prevailed only twice—a success rate of 8.7%. The insurer acts
rationally, settling the cases it believes it may lose, and refusing to settle
cases it believes it will win. The strong correlation between the insurer’s
liability rating and the eventual outcome of the cases (Table 8) bears this
point out.
The overall payment rate noted in Table 1 (30.1%) is lower than that
reported in other studies.29 This is somewhat surprising because the data
consist of filed civil lawsuits, cases in which plaintiff’s counsel at least
26. Sloan and Hsieh, supra note 12.
27. “Death” cases indemnities are typically less than indemnity payments for major permanent,
significant permanent, and grave injuries. Charles Silver et al., Policy Limits, Payments and Blood Money,
5 UC IRVINE L. REV. 559, 572 (2015).
28. Sloan and Hsieh, supra note 12.
29. Rahmati, Screening Plaintiffs, supra note 5.
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initially felt had a chance of success. However, in sixteen of these cases
the insurer incurred defense costs of less than $5,000, suggesting that
plaintiff’s counsel abandoned those cases early in the litigation process.30
When those cases are removed, the overall payment rate improves to
33.3%. A liability rating was available for 13 of these 16 cases. Twelve
were rated as “no liability” and one was rated as “unknown liability.” It
comes down to case-picking, and some plaintiff’s counsel are clearly
better at that than others.31
The strong connection between the insurer’s internal liability rating and
eventual payment of an indemnity reflects the fact that medical
malpractice litigation is seldom a contest between equally matched
opponents. The insurer has access to internal reviews from physicians
practicing in the state along with an experienced set of adjusters. Put more
broadly, the insurer is a repeat player working with access to a substantial
history of claims, their disposition, and what they may be worth. In
addition, the insurer relies on a small number of defense counsel (25 in
this study) to defend 229 lawsuits, or an average of over nine lawsuits per
attorney. Thus, in the context of medical malpractice litigation, defense
counsel are themselves repeat players. The same cannot be said about
plaintiff’s counsel. The 229 plaintiffs were represented by 128 different
lawyers, an average of less than two lawsuits per attorney. As a result,
plaintiff’s counsel can expect to be opposed by defense counsel of at least
equal, and probably greater experience in medical malpractice litigation.
Once again, astute case-picking seems to be the critical skill for a
plaintiff’s lawyer to have.
The number of plaintiff’s experts was the strongest predictor of the
amount of the indemnity paid. This, too, makes sense. The number of
experts a plaintiff can recruit depends upon the strength of the plaintiff’s
case. It also depends upon the amount of money plaintiff’s counsel is
willing to spend, and the amount of money plaintiff’s counsel believes
can be recovered. The number of defense experts, relative to the number
of plaintiff’s experts, had little impact on the amount paid. In only 13 of
the 71 cases in which money was paid did the number of plaintiff’s
experts exceed the number of defense experts. In the remaining
“indemnity paid” cases, the number of plaintiff’s experts was either less
than or equal to the number of defense experts.

30. Id.
31. Plaintiff lawyers who specialize in medical malpractice are notoriously picky about the cases
they take on, but some plaintiff’s lawyers are pickier than others. See David A. Hyman, Medical
Malpractice Litigation and the Market for Plaintiff-Side Representation: Evidence from Illinois, 13 J.
EMP. LEGAL STUDIES 603 (2016).
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CONCLUSION
There is evidence of rationality not only in the fact of payment, but in
the amount of payment made. The determination of what claims will be
paid is largely a function of the insurer’s assessment of liability. The
determination of amount of payment seems to be affected by non-medical
factors, specifically the number of plaintiff’s experts, the plaintiff’s age,
and the plaintiff’s marital status. These results should not be surprising.
Medical factors, as reflected in the insurer’s liability rating, are taken into
account in making the determination to settle the claim. Once that
decision is made, non-medical factors become more important, such as
the apparent strength of the plaintiff’s case (the number of experts), the
plaintiff’s age, and the plaintiff’s marital status. In light of the relatively
small number of cases examined in this study, further research would be
useful.
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